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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of income inequality on public good provision in an experi-
mental setting. A sample of secondary school students were recruited to participate in a simple
linear public goods game where income heterogeneity was introduced by providing participants
with unequal token endowments. The results show that endowment heterogeneity does not have
any signi￿cant impact on contributions to the public good, and that consistent with models of
reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to
the public pool. Moreover, individuals appear to adjust their contributions in order to maintain
a fair share rule.
1 Introduction
Economists have become increasingly interested in the impact of heterogeneity on the provision of
public goods, but while there is agreement that heterogeneity is likely to a⁄ect the provision of
public goods, disagreement arises over the direction of such an e⁄ect. One school of thought argues
that heterogeneity results in the under-provision of public goods, since heterogeneity undermines
group cohesion, thereby raising the transactions costs of bargaining. Individuals may be more prone
to co-operate when others in their group or community are similar to them, since this fosters a
strong group identity (Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Kollock, 1998). Groups characterised by greater
heterogeneity, be it extreme wealth inequalities or ethnic diversity, may be less successful in resolving
collective action dilemmas, not only because polarised societies may be more prone to competitive
rent-seeking by di⁄erent groups within that society, but also because such diversity may promote
polarisation in preferences, thereby making it di¢ cult to reach consensus of the type and quality of
public goods and services to be provided (Baland and Platteau 1997a,b; Alesina and Drazen, 1991).
An alternative school of thought, however, posits that heterogeneity will result in higher provision of
the public good since heterogeneity is associated with a less well-endowed median voter, who "votes"
in favour of public good provision. Moreover, if the bene￿ts of public goods are purely localised, and
enjoyed by speci￿c groups alone, be they ethnic groups or groups de￿ned in terms of income/wealth
status, then a common pool model may well imply the over-provision of public goods in the context
of ethnic or income diversity (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).
Alongside this work, there is now a growing body of experimental results that have tackled the
same question using public goods games (see for example Anderson, Mellor and Milyo, 2003; Chan
et al, 1999; Cherry, Kroll and Shogren, 2003; Rappoport and Suleiman, 1993), and our work forms
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1part of this tradition. In this paper, we report the results of linear public goods games that explicitly
examine the impact of income heterogeneity, introduced through the random allocation of di⁄ering
player endowments, on aggregate contributions to the public good at the group level, as well as
the di⁄erential e⁄ect that such heterogeneity has on the contributions of well-endowed individuals
relative to less well endowed group members. We ￿nd that endowment heterogeneity does not have
any signi￿cant impact on contributions to the public good, and that consistent with models of
reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the
public pool. Moreover, individuals appear to adjust their contributions in order to maintain a fair
share rule.
2 Public Goods Games and Income Inequality
Since Bohm (1972) ￿rst investigated the willingness of individuals to provide public goods in an
experimental setting, a multitude of these studies have been undertaken (see Ledyard (1995) for a
detailed overview of public goods experiments). Whilst experimental designs may vary, the most
common approach is to use the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) or Public Goods (PG)
game to examine this question.
The details of a simple, linear public goods game are as follows. A group of subjects ￿usually
between 4 and 10 people ￿take part in the experiment. Each individual is given an endowment of
tokens that they can allocate between their private account and a public account or common pool1.
Any tokens that are placed in the private account are kept by the individual for himself. Those
tokens placed in the public account are totalled and then multiplied by some factor, k ￿where k
is greater than 1 but less than the number (n) of participants in the game - and then distributed
equally amongst all n players in the group, irrespective of whether the individual contributed to
the public account or not. Thus, an individual￿ s payo⁄ is increasing in the number of tokens in the
public account but each token invested by a player provides a private return that is less than the
value of the token. For example, suppose k=2 and n=4. A token placed in the public account will
yield only one half of the value of the token for the contributing player - the marginal per capita
return (MPCR) is 0.5. The structure of this game results in a unique Nash equilibrium of zero
contributions to the public account because each player has a dominant strategy to free-ride on the
contributions of others.
Numerous studies have shown that this prediction is not borne out by the experimental results.
In single round (￿one shot￿ ) public goods games, individuals do not play the Nash Equilibrium but
generally contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment to the public account (Dawes &
Thaler, 1988: 189). In multiple round (￿repeated play￿ ) public goods games, contribution rates to
the public account tend to decay over the course of the game but remain at between 15 to 25 percent
of the endowment by the ￿nal round (Ostrom, 2000: 140). Thus, it would appear that individuals
are not motivated solely by self-interest as classical economic theory presumes.
Experimenters have used a variety of methods to introduce income heterogeneity into public
goods games. These methods include varying participant￿ s show-up fees (Anderson, Mellor & Milyo,
2003), and providing subjects with di⁄erent endowments2 (Chan et al., 1999; Cherry, Kroll &
Shrogen, 2003; Rappoport & Suleiman, 1993; and Bergstrom et al., 1986). Much like the theoretical
and econometric work in this area, the results from these studies are mixed, with some authors
￿nding that income inequality tends to reduce group contributions to the public account (Bergstrom
et al., 1986; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Anderson, Mellor and Milyo, 2003), while others report higher
1￿ Account￿and ￿ pool￿are synonymous and will be used interchangeably throughout the text.
2The show-up fee is the money paid to participants simply for taking part in the experiment. An individual receives
an endowment of tokens in each round of a repeated public goods game. To introduce income inequality to a public
goods game one can vary the show-up fees or token endowments of participants. When each participant is allocated
the same unequal endowment in all rounds of the game, this introduces continual, as opposed to initial, inequality in
incomes.
2aggregate contributions (Cherry, Kroll & Shrogen, 2003; Chan et al., 1996; and Cardenas, 2002).
In part, these di⁄erences may be attributed to di⁄erences in the design of public goods games3.
Relatively fewer studies have focused on how income heterogeneity a⁄ects the contributions of the
wealthier group members relative to the less wealthy. Again, the evidence is mixed, but while
earlier studies suggested that wealthier individuals tended to over-contribute to the provision of
public goods (Bergstrom et al, 1986), the weight of more recent studies is in favour of the opposite
conclusion, namely that less well endowed players tend to over-contribute to the public pool relative
to the wealthier individuals in the group (Chan et al, 1996; Cardenas, 2002; Buckley and Croson,
2004
3 Explaining public goods provision when income inequality
is present: Altruism, Inequality aversion and reciprocity
Regardless of the method in which inequality is introduced into the game, models of altruism,
inequality aversion and reciprocity have been proposed to derive predictions about the impact of
inequality on public good provision. These models o⁄er di⁄erent predictions of individual behaviour,
particularly with regards to absolute and relative contributions to the public pool.
In Becker￿ s (1974) model of altruism, an altruist￿ s utility is an increasing function of his own
income and the income of other individuals. Thus:
UA = UA (XA;XB)
where XA and XB are the payo⁄s to the altruist and the other members of his group, respectively,
and taken together, they constitute ￿social income￿ . Since an altruist will act to maximise ￿social
income￿ , he will refrain from all actions that lower the income of other individuals by more than
they increase his own, because this would lower ￿social income￿and reduce the altruist￿ s utility.
Importantly, individuals motivated solely by altruism should contribute their entire token endowment
to the public account, because on the margin, the ratio of the altruist￿ s utility to the utility of the
other group members equals 1 by de￿nition (Becker, 1976: 819), implying that he will always
contribute a token to the public account because by not doing so he necessarily lowers ￿social
income￿ .4 Consequently, in a public goods game where endowment heterogeneity is introduced,
since an altruist should contribute his entire endowment, high-income players should contribute a
larger absolute amount to the public account than low-income players, by mere virtue of the fact
that they have more tokens to contribute. Note, however, that since contributions in these public
goods games rarely approximate 100%5, altruism does not appear to provide a complete explanation
for behaviour in these games.
Models of inequality aversion posit that an individual￿ s utility increases in the equality of payo⁄s
of all the players (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Individuals derive utility not only from their payo⁄
3In a linear public goods game, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) is constant throughout the course of the
experiment. In a non-linear public goods game, the MPCR varies as the level of contributions change. Consequently,
linear and non-linear public goods games have di⁄erent equilibrium predictions. This is an important factor in
explaining the divergent results presented above as some of those studies used a linear public goods game while others
used the non-linear variant.
4As an example, if the marginal per capita return from the public account is 0.5 and an altruist is deciding whether
to contribute a token to the public or private account, he will contribute this token to the public account to maximise
￿social income￿. Although contributing this token to the public account lowers his potential payo⁄ by 0.5 tokens,
it raises the other participant￿ s payo⁄s by 0.5 tokens each. In the example above, where n=4, this would raise the
combined payo⁄ of the other participants by 1.5 tokens. The 1.5 token gain of the rest of the group o⁄sets the 0.5
token loss of the altruist, and therefore it will always be in the altruist￿ s interest to contribute a token to the public
account.
5When communication is allowed amongst group members, contributions do increase signi￿cantly and may ap-
proach 100%. Arguably, in this instance though, contributions are motivated by communication as opposed to
altruism.
3but also from their position with respect to the other members of their group. Individuals dislike






















where ￿iis the material payo⁄ to player i and ￿avg is the average payo⁄ to the rest of the group. It
is assumed that ￿i > ￿i > 0. This utility function is increasing in i0s payo⁄ and decreasing in his
aversion to di⁄erences in payo⁄s, with his aversion to disadvantageous inequality (represented by ￿i)
weighted more heavily than his aversion to advantageous inequality (represented by ￿i). In a public
goods game with endowment heterogeneity, these models predict that high-income individuals will
contribute a larger fraction of their endowment to the public account than low-income individuals
to reduce inequality (thereby equalising earnings) in the group (Buckley & Croson, 2004: 4).
Finally, models of reciprocity have also been advanced to explain voluntary contributions to
public goods (Sugden, 1984). The principle of reciprocity requires that if members of the group
are voluntarily contributing to a public good from which the individual derives bene￿ts, then that
individual is morally obliged to reciprocate their kindness and contribute to the good, even though
self-interest would suggest defection as the optimal strategy. Individuals are thus viewed as con-
ditional co-operators, contributing when others in the group contribute, but defecting when others
defect as well.
Sugden (1984) suggests that in situations where income heterogeneity exists, reciprocating in-
dividuals will contribute their ￿fair share￿to the provision of a public good, provided that others
are also contributing. ￿Fair share￿ , in this context, demands that individuals contribute ￿e⁄ort as
relative money contribution: a person￿ s e⁄ort is measured by the size of his money contribution as
a proportion of his income￿(Sugden, 1984: 776). Therefore, individuals reciprocate by contribut-
ing the same fraction of their endowment as the other members of their group. For example, they
may all try to contribute 25 percent of their endowment to the public good. This model predicts
that in public goods with endowment heterogeneity, high and low-income individuals will tend to
contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public account so as to conform to a ￿fair
share￿threshold, implying that the absolute contribution of a high-income individual is larger than
that of a low-income individual.
To summarise, various models have been proposed to explain contributions to public goods under
conditions of income heterogeneity. Models of altruism predict that individuals will contribute their
entire endowment to the public account to maximise ￿social income￿ . Thus, high-income individuals
contribute more in absolute terms than low-income individuals because they have larger endowments.
Models of inequality aversion predict that high-income individuals will contribute a larger percentage
of their endowment (and thus larger absolute amount as well) to the public account than low-income
individuals to reduce inequality in the group. On the other hand, models of reciprocity predict
that high and low-income individuals will contribute the same fraction of their endowment (but
di⁄erent absolute amounts) to the public account because individuals bring notions of fairness to
each interaction. The experimental design used in this paper allows us to explicitly test which of
these models appears most consistent with our data.
4 Experimental Design
For this study, eighty secondary-school children were recruited from Khayelitsha in the Western Cape
of South Africa. Participants were recruited through a non-governmental organisation providing
extra tuition in Mathematics, English and Science. Just over 50% of the individuals in this sample
were male. On average, the participants were 18 years old, had lived in Khayelitsha for just less
than half their lives, and the majority reported Xhosa as their home language.
4Participants were randomly assigned to groups of four to take part in a simple linear public
goods game - as adapted by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) - which lasted for ten rounds and
had a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 0.56. There were 20 groups in total. Ten groups
were assigned to participate in the Equal treatment (where all participants received the same token
endowment) and ten in the Unequal treatment (where participants randomly received di⁄erent token
endowments). In the equal treatment, each participant received 40 tokens to divide between the
public and private accounts in each round of the game. In the unequal treatment, two participants
in the group received 30 tokens and two received 50 tokens to play with in each round. Thus, income
heterogeneity was introduced in the unequal treatment by varying participant￿ s endowment levels.
Endowment status was randomly allocated, and each token was worth 10c. For the groups in the
equal treatment, the experimenter announced that all players had received 40 tokens to play with in
each round of the game. For groups in the unequal treatment, the experimenter announced that two
players had received 50 tokens and that two had received 30 tokens to play with in each round of the
game. However, the actual identity of high and low endowment players was not publicly revealed in
the group. Individuals maintained their endowment status for the duration of the experiment. 7
The games were run at the public library in Khayelitsha. For each experimental session, partic-
ipants were directed to their groups and then taken into the library. Here, subjects were seated at
separate tables which were divided by partitions to ensure that the individual￿ s decisions were pri-
vate. Each participant was asked to read and sign a consent form before the experiment began. The
experimenter then carefully explained the details of the public goods game before working through
examples with the participants. Two practice rounds were conducted before the start of the ￿rst
round to ensure that participants correctly understood the game. At the end of the experiment,
participants were asked to ￿ll out a questionnaire that elicited information about their background,
their extra-curricular activities and their answers to a range of attitudinal questions. Participants
earned R128 on average for participating in the experiments of which R20 was a show-up fee given
to each individual for taking part in the
games. Experimental sessions lasted for approximately two and a half hours.
5 Results
Result 1: Endowment heterogeneity has no signi￿cant impact on contributions to the public good.
Figure 1 below presents a plot of the mean o⁄ers per round across Equal and Unequal treatment
groups. In Equal treatment groups, the average contribution in round one of the game is 33% , and
while there is some variation in mean contributions over rounds, the mean contribution in the ￿nal
round of the game is also 33%. In contrast, in the Unequal treatment groups, average contributions
in round 1 are 46%, and fall to 42% by the ￿nal round. Thus, unlike other studies, we do not see the
same rate of decline in mean contributions to the public good over rounds. In part, this may have
to do with the relative homogeneity of our sample as well as the relatively small group size, which,
6This follows the trend in the international literature to set MPCR at 0.5.(Andreoni, 1988a&b; Croson, 1998).
7The decision making exercise was described to participants in the following way: You have been given a number
of tokens to play with. In each round, you must decide how many tokens to put into a Private Account, and
how many to put into a Public Account. Any tokens you put into the Private Account, you will keep for
yourself. Keep a record of your decision on your Personal Record Sheet. You will also earn tokens from the
Public Account. At the end of each round, the number of tokens in the Public Account will be added up. This
number will be DOUBLED, and we will then divide this equally amongst everyone in the group, irrespective of how
many tokens you put into the Public Account. Your total earnings from the round will be equal to the number of
tokens in the Private Account + the tokens you get from the Public Account. We will repeat this 6 times. At the end
of the 6 rounds, we will add up all the tokens you have earned during each round of the game, and this will tell us
how much to pay you. Each token you earn is worth ten cents. For example, if you earn 500 tokens, you will be
paid R50. A full copy of the instructions used can be obtained from the authors on request. In addition, participants
were taken through a number of numerical examples prior to the commencement of the game, to ensure that everyone
understood the game properly.
5according to Olson￿ s (1965) logic of collective action, makes it easier for participants to co-ordinate
their actions, and makes deviation from the group mean less likely.8
While contributions in unequal groups are higher than contributions in equal groups on average,
these di⁄erences are not signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level.9. This is con￿rmed by the pooled
OLS regression results presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, which suggest that while o⁄ers in
equal treatment groups are lower than unequal groups, this di⁄erence is not signi￿cant (even if one
limits the analysis to Round 1 only, where the observed di⁄erence in mean o⁄ers appears largest).
All regressions include controls for group dummies10 and age. (not reported) "All" includes both
the equal and unequal treatments. Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. *** = 1% signi￿cance;
** = 5% signi￿cance; * = 10% signi￿cance.
Result 2: Consistent with models of reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the
same fraction of their endowment to the public account
As the results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 suggests, low and high endowment players in the
unequal treatment tend to contribute a similar fraction of their endowment to the public account
across rounds. Although the coe¢ cient on ￿Low endowment player (30 tokens)￿is positive, this
variable is not signi￿cant. Thus, there is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the contributions
of low and high endowment players, as a fraction of their endowment, across the 10 rounds of the
game. A regression including observations only from round 1 also ￿nds that there is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence in contributions to the public account between low and high endowment players when
controlling for group level di⁄erences (Column 4, Table 1).
Since low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the
public account, this means that high endowment players must also contribute a larger absolute
amount, on average, to this account. This was con￿rmed in regression results (not reported here),
indicating that high endowment players contribute 6.4 tokens more, on average, than low endowment
players and that this value is signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. While this result is consistent with
models of altruism and reciprocity, we take the view that reciprocity is a more plausible explanation.
Since the aggregate contributions to the public pool never approach 100 percent of the groups￿token
endowment, models of altruism fail to provide a complete account of the results from this study.
Moreover, models of inequality aversion assert that high-income individuals will contribute a larger
fraction of their endowment to the public account than low-income individuals - our results do not
support such a model to explain our results.
Result 3 Individuals adjust their contributions to maintain the fair share rule
In the discussion of Sugden￿ s (1984) model of reciprocity, it was suggested that individuals
bring notions of fairness to each interaction which a⁄ect their behaviour. In a public goods game,
reciprocity requires that individuals contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public
account as the other players in their group, as we have demonstrated above.
Table 3 presents regression results, in which we examine whether changes in the fraction of
the endowment contributed appears to be responsive to this notion of a fair share threshold. Sug-
den￿ s notion of a fair share threshold in which all individuals contribute the same fraction of their
endowment to the public account was formalised by creating the following variable:
D =
￿
tokens contributed by i




Total tokens in pool ￿ tokens contributed by i
Maximum number of tokens in pool ￿ token endowment of i
￿
where D is the deviation from the fair share threshold. The ￿rst term in this expression simply
represents individual i￿ s contribution to the public pool as a fraction of his endowment, whilst the
second term represents the average contribution of others in the group to the public pool (also
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
9The Mann-Whitney z-statistic is -1.79 (p=0.073).
10Since the game is played in groups of 4, individual outcomes within groups is likely to be more correlated than
outcomes across groups, particularly since each group will develop a game dynamic of its own. Thus, group dummies
are included to control for any group speci￿c e⁄ects that might in￿uence the results.
6measured as a fraction of endowment status). This variable will take on a positive value when
individual i has contributed more as a fraction of his endowment than the rest of his group.
We include this variable as a lagged regressor in our model to determine whether an individual￿ s
deviation from the fair share threshold in the previous round will a⁄ect the change in his contribution
between this round and the next. If individuals are conditional co-operators motivated by reciprocity
concerns, then we would expect the coe¢ cient on D to be negative since individuals who contributed
more than their fair share in the previous round should adjust their o⁄ers downwards. The converse
holds true. Our results presented in Table 2 con￿rm that this is indeed the case.
Result 4 Contributions by the majority of players approximate a conditional fair share threshold.
That players appear to adjust their o⁄ers in response to a fair share rule with the result that
both high and low endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment is quite
remarkable, especially when one considers the cognitive demands involved in calculating how much
the other players of an individual￿ s group contributed relative to what they could have contributed
(particularly in the unequal treatment where endowment heterogeneity exists).
However, even more remarkable is the fact that this choice behaviour e⁄ectively implements
contributions that approximate what we term a ￿conditional fair share threshold￿ , namely, each
player￿ s contribution to the total resources in the public account is in direct proportion to their
endowment allocation. More speci￿cally, our data suggests that individuals may have calculated
the ratio of their token endowment to the total tokens allocated to the group to construct a fair
share threshold that informs their decisions. In equal treatment groups, this amounts to each player
contributing 25 percent (40/160) of the total tokens in the public account. In unequal groups, low
endowment players would have to contribute 19 percent (30/160) and high endowment players 31
percent (50/160) of the total tokens in the public account for their contributions to approximate
this fair share threshold.
To illustrate this point, assume that 40 tokens have been allocated to the public account in total
in one round of an unequal treatment game. As a high endowment player, a fair share contribution
would have been 12.5 tokens (calculated as (5/16)*40). As a low endowment player, a fair share
contribution would have been 7.5 tokens (calculated as (3/16)*40). Note that in following this rule,
these individuals would both contribute 25% of their token endowment (since 7.5/30 = 12.5/50 =
0.25), thereby satisfying the reciprocity requirement11.
Panel B12 of Table 3 presents compelling evidence that individual contributions to the public
account approximate a conditional fair share threshold (conditional on the individual￿ s endowment).
On average, participants in the equal treatment groups contribute 25 percent of the total tokens
in the public account. In unequal groups, low endowment players contribute 21 percent and high
endowment players contribute 29 percent, on average, of the total tokens in the public pool. Although
low endowment players contribute slightly more than their fair share and high endowment players
slightly less, these di⁄erences are not signi￿cant. Moreover, Result 2 demonstrated that there is
no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the contributions of low and high endowment players as a
fraction of their income, implying that individuals￿decisions are motivated by concerns for fairness
and reciprocity.
6 Discussion
The results from this study suggest that individuals did bring preferences for fairness to the experi-
mental setting. The results suggest that equal and unequal groups contribute the same fraction of
11Forty tokens was an arbitrary value used for illustrative purposes. This result holds for any group contribution
to the public account. Importantly, this result hinges on making a distinction between the fraction of the individual
endowment contributed (e.g. 25% of token endowment), and the fraction of the total resources in the public pool
accounted for by the individual￿ s contribution (In this case, 19% for low endowment players).
12Panel A provides data on the average fraction of the endowment contributed in each round for comparison. Panel
B presents data on the fraction of the total tokens in the public pool accounted for by the individual￿ s contriburion.
7their endowment to the public account across the ten rounds of the game, and that high and low
endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public account. Individ-
uals￿contributions to the public account approximate a fair share threshold, even in the presence
of endowment heterogeneity, and deviations from this threshold prompt correcting behaviour. If an
individual has contributed less than his fair share in a particular round he will increase his contri-
bution between this round and the next, and vice-versa. Thus, a strong concern for reciprocity is
evident in the results.
Such reciprocal behaviour may also provide at least a partial explanation for why our data do
not demonstrate the same rate of decline in contributions across rounds as in some other studies.
Individuals appear to make numerous adjustments to their contributions in order to maintain their
fair share. This, combined with the fact that these participants knew one another well and had
participated in numerous study sessions together, would serve to maintain co-operation in this
setting.
An interesting question that arises is why participants in these games do not appear to be
concerned with minimising inequality in token endowments. One possibility is simply that the
extent of the inequality (30 tokens versus 50 tokens) was not large enough to induce a strong
behavioural response in this regard. Another possibility is that the cognitive requirements involved
in calculating the di⁄erences in payo⁄s to high and low endowment players in a particular round,
thereby adjustments in contributions in the following rounds so as to equalise earnings in the group
may have been too high. This would have been particularly di¢ cult given the limited information
that individuals received at the end of each round ￿how many tokens were contributed to the public
account in total and how much each player therefore earned from the public account. Thus, although
individuals may be averse to inequality per se, they may struggle to determine whether inequality is
in fact being reduced (or increased) throughout the course of the game. Both of these possibilities
suggest interesting avenues for future research studies to pursue.
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Table 1: Fraction of endowment contributed to public account by treatment 
 
Dep var: Fraction of endowment contributed to public pool 







  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Round  -0.001    -0.002   
  (-0.66)    (-0.83)   
Equal Treatment  -0.044  -0.089    
  (-0.72)  (-0.45)    
Low endowment player (30 tokens)     0.033  0.084 
     (1.2)  (0.92) 
Constant  0.78 ***  0.85 *  1.18 ***  0.88 
  (5.48)  (1.88)  (6.05)  (1.36) 
        
Adj. R2  0.18  0.13  0.25  0.07 












11Table 2: Adjustments in contributions to maintain a fair share 
 
Dep var: Change in fraction of endowment contributed to public pool 
  All  Unequal treatment only 
  (1)  (2) 
        
Round  0.000    0.001   
  (-0.016)    (0.233)   
Equal Treatment  -0.032      
  (-0.51)      
Low endowment player (30 tokens)     0.015   
     (0.54)   
Deviation from fair share in previous round  -0.760  ***  -0.788  *** 
  (-20.35)    (-14.79)   
Constant  0.660  ***  0.960  *** 
  (4.37)    (4.5)   
        
Adj. R2  0.360    0.370   
n  720    360   
 
All regressions include controls for group dummies, age and the combined contributions by others in the  
group in the previous round (not shown) . 
  "All" includes both the equal and unequal treatments. Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 































Table 3: Mean contributions by round 
 
      Panel A: Number of tokens contributed as fraction of endowment     Panel B: Number of tokens contributed as fraction of tokens in pool 
Round       





















                   
Round 1  Mean  0.51  0.33  0.43  0.40     0.20  0.25  0.30  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.33  0.28  0.27  0.30     0.14  0.20  0.17  0.18 
                     
Round 2  Mean  0.39  0.37  0.44  0.39     0.17  0.25  0.33  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.29  0.28  0.26  0.27     0.12  0.19  0.17  0.18 
                     
Round 3  Mean  0.41  0.32  0.29  0.33     0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.31  0.26  0.21  0.26     0.16  0.21  0.18  0.19 
                     
Round 4  Mean  0.32  0.31  0.39  0.33     0.19  0.25  0.31  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.31  0.30  0.30  0.30     0.21  0.23  0.24  0.23 
                     
Round 5  Mean  0.40  0.34  0.39  0.36     0.19  0.25  0.31  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.36  0.29  0.28  0.30     0.20  0.19  0.23  0.21 
                     
Round 6  Mean  0.45  0.35  0.29  0.36     0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.31  0.30  0.26  0.30     0.17  0.23  0.22  0.21 
                     
Round 7  Mean  0.40  0.40  0.31  0.38     0.22  0.25  0.28  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.37  0.28  0.26  0.30     0.19  0.15  0.20  0.17 
                     
Round 8  Mean  0.40  0.30  0.42  0.36     0.23  0.25  0.27  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.33  0.31  0.37  0.33     0.25  0.25  0.26  0.25 
                     
Round 9  Mean  0.33  0.34  0.36  0.34     0.18  0.25  0.32  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.37  0.30  0.34  0.32     0.19  0.20  0.23  0.21 
                     
Round 10  Mean  0.39  0.33  0.45  0.37     0.20  0.25  0.30  0.25 
   Std. Dev  0.41  0.29  0.34  0.34     0.25  0.20  0.25  0.22 
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